Deconstructing Indian navy’s combat capability – Post Pahalgam

#Deconstructing #Indian #navys #combat #capability #Post #Pahalgam

May 10, 2025, as a study of the war between the two nuclear powers, will come down to the dates of modern history. Existing and future scholars, nuclear and military tactics, as well as for decades, will be widely examined worldwide by war practitioners. This will create an impression on the existing nuclear ideas of the states and re -consider the concept of a limited traditional war under the highest limit. In the contemporary living memories of humanity, two nuclear powers are never tested with such deadly weapons that support modern technology and platforms. This was the final test to oppose the “will” to dominate the scaling ladder.

Since Pakistan launched its aggressive reaction in early May 10, the ‘Bonyan Um-Marsus’, it was clear that the state equipped with nuclear weapons had pledged not to allow its top opponent to establish the new routine. For decades, the United States and the West have been encouraged and lauded, Pakistan’s aggressive attack on 20 military locations in India was nothing short of thunderstorms for New Delhi.

Since the clouds of war are still and poisonous but ends to struggle for the recovery of Modi and his cable, it is clear that it was India that Washington, Riyadh, and Ankara requested intervention and seizure settlement. At any stage, Pakistan had never sought a ceasefire, but despite repeated efforts to invalidate aggression, he used a strategic ban.

In his important work, in armed work without any purpose: India’s military modernity, published many years ago, renowned writers Stephen Cohen and Sunil Das Gupta spoke openly, ‘India’s military modernization lacks strategic planning. Thus, despite having modern resources, the country’s efforts are obstructed due to lack of strategic military planning, which results in military change. ‘In this account, India is clearly charged with the acquisition of technology without explaining the military strategic goals. In addition to the delays and costs affecting the Indian Navy’s operational preparations, it is identified in the technical issues imposed on the operational effectiveness and the statement. It seems that no lesson was developed by strategic minds in the Indian Navy.

At the end of 2015, the Indian Navy published its Apex document, titled The Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS). The important thing is that, among other things, India’s seafood detachment and impact, prevention strategy, and conflict strategy. Interestingly, the Indian Navy also crowns itself under the title “Net Security Provider” (NSP) for the Indian Navy. Under ‘pure security principles’, it states, ‘Pure maritime security principles will guide the wide procedures to reduce the general risks and challenges, and create conditions under which they will be monitored, present and countered.’ The forecast recognizes the change in the national point of view towards the sea and the maritime domain, and the clear identity of maritime security is an important factor in national development and international engagements. According to the IMSS, ‘India’s international trade is more than 90 % of the volume and 70 % is priced in the oceans.’

Fast forward in 2025. In a press release issued by the White House after a meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi in Washington, the following words as India’s “pure security provider” is the most valuable treasure: ‘The United States praises a development, humanitarian and purely aid to the Indian Ocean.

After the days after the incident in Pahalgam and after the events, the Indian Navy received a check for a reality. He thought herself less than that or worthy of a fighter than he was making it more than what the world was claiming. The echoes of fruitful developments in the North Arabia are more important than the Indian Ocean, that Washington and perhaps other global capitals.

A new chapter has been written in the waters of the northern Arabian Ocean. Its author is a small, network, well -integrated, and passionate Pakistan Navy. In addition to the navy of the quad member states, despite the tremendous claims and years of partnerships in the mega naval exercises with the United States Navy, the Indian Navy’s self -importance is in the importance and destruction of the Navy.

As one of the aircraft carriers operating one of the World Navy, the dispute was a great opportunity for the Indian Navy to show these mega platforms. Basically, a powerful tool for power projection, maritime control, and sea dominance, the purpose of aircraft carrier is to cause. Its defense jobs run in the first place in a plane career raisins. Here, the Indian Navy was holding a carrier about 700 700 km (380 nm) south south of the coast of Pakistan. Putting a carrier beetle group from the coast of Pakistan to a remote location was clearly indicated by its employment safety and cautious nature. It was a safe place away from the Central War theater. And there was a navy that claimed to be a ‘pure security provider’ for the region and wanted global ambitions.

To be fair, however, the Indian plane’s carrier faced numerous threats. In addition to defense operations, there was a shortage of fighter jets on the board as well as aggressive operations. The threat of missiles surfaced by the airplanes of the Pakistan Navy’s long -range missiles created a challenge. Pakistan Navy submarines, equipped with sub -level -level missiles, posed another serious threat. It does not have to mention long -range career killer missiles on the coast of Pakistan, which is linked to strong air defense systems.

With the compelling employment of platforms and weapons systems, the Pakistan Navy’s anti -access and refusal of the area (A2/AD) spread a lot of fear and panic in the opposing ranks. In this way, despite the many times larger and holding the scary platforms, the Indian Navy blinks.

War, according to the Persian General Claus Witz, who reads widely, is a confrontation of the Walls. The aspect that is scattered to fight with the will of the enemy benefits it. It learns that the Indian Navy probably ignored its own danger when it traveled to fight the Pakistan Navy.

With the elimination of “Will”, the Indian Navy had little choice in fear of the Pakistan Navy, in addition to resolving assets in a safe haven. Satellite images clearly showed the vicinity, which was previously deployed to the sea, was only withdrawn suddenly and was targeted inside the Indian port Corver. Where is the strategy for conflict prevention and strategy?

More than establishing dominance, the Indian Navy made all efforts to stay away from the path of loss in the North Arabian Sea, which is under the influence of the Pakistan Navy. Massive dislikes and clearly lie about targeting and damaging the Karachi port, Karachi’s blockade, etc., are now fully exposed. The truth reminds us of one of the Sanskrit and the national slogan

India’s: “Satyamifa Jite” victory of truth. “In fact, this time, it seems that it has closed the self -made title and national slogan of the Indian Navy on its head.

A). Pakistan Navy’s A2/AD strategy is certified and established

b). Indian Navy’s unacceptable and ‘Net Security Provider’ position has been broken

c). The Indian Navy’s carrier task group proved an unpleasant failure to set conditions for local maritime control, letting northern Arabs dominate.

D). The Indian Navy’s carrier, fighting ships, and modern submarines failed to eliminate the Pakistan Navy’s solution and destabilization capability.

e). The US Navy and Partner Navy raise serious questions about the operational and other aspects of the Indian Navy’s capabilities, its recently demonstrated, on such investment.

Will this be a cause for re -meditation in Washington or will it outsource its strategic responsibilities in an important region in front of a partner Navy that, despite heavy investment, hardware and operational support, stands by a small Pakistan Navy? This decision can be left safely on time and perhaps by the next. However, the misunderstanding of India’s regional police personnel and pure security providers was abolished and completely broken.

The author is an independent researcher who has a constant interest in maritime security, strategic and naval affairs.