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He said that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan [“the Constitution”]Article 239, under Part XI, grants Parliament authority to amend any of its provisions. A constitutional amendment can be initiated in either house of Parliament, but requires a two-thirds majority of the total members for passage. The Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, came into effect on November 13, 2025, upon the ascension of the President of Pakistan, after being passed by a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the National Assembly.
The 27th Amendment created a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and introduced extensive textual and structural revisions to more than twenty articles of the Constitution. The stated reason for the amendment is to ensure exclusive adjudication of constitutional matters, thereby allowing the Supreme Court to hear civil and criminal appeals. This model draws inspiration from jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy and Turkey, where constitutional courts exist as a separate entity.
In Part VII, after Chapter 1, a new ‘Chapter 1A’ has been inserted, containing Articles 175b to 175L, to define and define the structure of the FCC, its jurisdiction and formation. The FCC has original jurisdiction over intergovernmental disputes, limited appellate jurisdiction in constitutional matters, and advisory and review powers.
The first Chief Justice of the FCC, Mr. Justice Aminuddin Khan, who was appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, was sworn in on November 14, 2025. He shall serve for a term of three years or till he attains the age of sixty-eight years, whichever is earlier. An FCC judge shall hold office until he or she attains the age of sixty-eight, unless he or she sooner resigns or is removed from office. According to the Constitution, judges of the Supreme Court or higher courts who decline appointments to the FCC are deemed to have retired.
The 27th Amendment also defined the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, which included parliamentary representation and a technocrat member. The restructuring reduces the judicial majority that has historically controlled appointments since the Al-Jihad Trust case, effectively shifting influence to the legislature. However, proponents describe it as an attempt to balance institutional powers while, on the contrary, it is seen as an encroachment on judicial independence.
The amendment further revises Article 243, abolishing the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and reorganizing the senior military command structure. It strengthens immunity for the President and Governors under Article 248 and imposes new procedural requirements in several articles related to the judiciary.
The creation of the FCC fulfills an old political commitment. The Charter of Democracy, signed in 2006 by the leaderships of both the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), envisioned such a court to handle constitutional questions, while the Supreme and High Courts retained their formal jurisdiction. Parliament has now turned this political pledge into a constitutional reality. Although the constitutional philosophy behind this amendment is specialization, its practical basis is in separation of powers.
Over the decades, the Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits, from removing elected prime ministers to fixing administrative prices. The self-extension of the judiciary under Article 184(3) often blurred the boundaries between law and politics. This section has now been repealed by the 27th Amendment. Earlier, the Twenty-sixth Amendment amended itself to moot jurisdiction.
The implications of this move are profound through the lens of constitutional political economy (CPE), a discipline that examines how political incentives shape constitutional design and institutional outcomes. In Pakistan, constitutional engineering has historically been reactionary, not reformist. Each amendment has emerged from political impasse rather than a long-term institutional vision. The 27th Amendment reflects this trend. Instead of building judicial discipline through accountability and transparency, the government used parliament to design the structure itself.
The economic dimension of this amendment is often neglected. Constitutional uncertainty has imposed heavy transaction costs on governance and investment. Similarly, the frequent restructuring of the judiciary indicates the instability of both domestic and foreign stakeholders. Establishing the FCC required significant administrative costs, judicial staff, and infrastructure investment, diverting public resources without guaranteeing any operational efficiency. Constitutional economy depends not only on institutional type but on institutional reputation.
The repeated reliance on the legislature instead of enforcement reveals a deeper pathology. These constitutional amendments fail to restore public confidence in governance. Likewise, citizens no longer trust the executive, parliament, judiciary, or law enforcement. The reason for this lies not in the text of the constitution but in the absence of institutional integrity. Furthermore, no government has seriously invested in capacity building, accountability, or merit-based autonomy within state organs. Parliament prefers rewriting rather than reforming.
Judiciary also imposes responsibility. From the Dosso case to the recent interference in political affairs, its historic endorsement of extraordinary measures has eroded constitutional sanctity. Similarly, Parliament’s reluctance to hold him accountable has fueled a cycle of constitutional manipulation. Every time the legislature oversteps the courts, not through inquiry or institutional reform but by introducing yet another amendment, the result is constitutional fatigue, a state where the form evolves but the function remains static.
From CPE’s perspective, the 27th Amendment reflects the tension between power protection and institutional balance. The independence of the Judiciary had come to dominate, igniting the powers of the legislature. The creation of the FCC may appear to be a balance, but a balance achieved by political motivation rarely creates stability. Furthermore, constitutional political economy teaches that sustainable institutions arise when incentives are aligned with the collective welfare, not when one power center neutralizes another.
The measure of success will not rest in the creation of new courts but whether it restores confidence in coherence, accountability and justice. The danger is that Pakistan’s constitutional evolution once again becomes an exercise in decentralization of authority rather than governance reform. The real challenge is in fostering an ethic of constitutional conduct of restraint, responsibility and integrity that no amendment alone can achieve. The broader goal should be to cultivate institutions that command respect through performance, not position, and ensure that justice is seen as impartial and accessible. Parliament has spoken with constitutional authority, but the question remains whether it has spoken with constitutional wisdom.
Dr. Akramul Haque, advocate of the Supreme Court and author, is an adjunct faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUM).
Abdul Rauf Shakuri is a corporate lawyer based in the United States of America.
